Free Pre Shared Key Generator 3,6/5 9238 reviews

Perfect Passwords
GRC's Ultra High Security
Password Generator
2,618 sets of passwords generated per day
33,542,726 sets of passwords generated for our visitors
DETECT “SECURE” CONNECTION INTERCEPTION with GRC's NEW HTTPS fingerprinting service!!

Generating long, high-quality random passwords is
not simple. So here is some totally random raw
material, generated just for YOU, to start with.

Every time this page is displayed, our server generates a unique set of custom, high quality, cryptographic-strength password strings which are safe for you to use:

64 random hexadecimal characters (0-9 and A-F):
4573E9B6CC0FB794F1BC55D2D78667189762835F5B8CDD9FDDBD014F9E142014

What is the Pre-Shared key and how do I get it? The Pre-Shared Key (sometimes called shared secret) is basically a form of password for your VPN gateway which is set up on your device. The Pre-Shared Key is specific to your gateway and can be found in your device's configuration guide.


  • Pre-shared keys. Let's start with an easy authentication option: pre-shared keys. For pre-shared key authentication to work, a common key is defined on each host. The key definition binds the key to the remote peer's ISAKMP identity. From a security perspective, the pest practice is to use a unique key.
  • Pre-Shared Keys in IPsec. The following section is related to site-to-site VPNs only and NOT to remote access VPNs. The pre-shared key is merely used for authentication, not for encryption! IPsec tunnels rely on the ISAKMP/IKE protocols to exchange the keys for encryption, etc.
  • Or you can use serial numbers, MAC addresses, or you could call each other and exchange two colours, favourite sports teams, etc. Note that whatever one party enters as 'Key 1' the other party must enter as 'Key 1', and whatever one party enters as 'Key 2' the other party must also enter as 'Key 2'.
63 random printable ASCII characters:
6z+ujbHMw0> G)i`45LV9$ c=9iKlfPq>RpMZ1d)<ehlAve&,pb4V;U5+wnUq$:

63 random alpha-numeric characters (a-z, A-Z, 0-9):
hAucyo2lN2srku3PRnWh4wyBygBeTAuUtf2B7NuQdeB4kVdZmSsql7N59do5YC2

Free Pre Shared Key Generator Reviews

Click your web browser's 'refresh' button a few times and watch the password strings change each time.

What makes these perfect and safe?
Every one is completely random (maximum entropy) without any pattern, and the cryptographically-strong pseudo random number generator we use guarantees that no similar strings will ever be produced again.

Also, because this page will only allow itself to be displayed over a snoop-proof and proxy-proof high-security SSL connection, and it is marked as having expired back in 1999, this page which was custom generated just now for you will not be cached or visible to anyone else.

Therefore, these password strings are just for you. No one else can ever see them or get them. You may safely take these strings as they are, or use chunks from several to build your own if you prefer, or do whatever you want with them. Each set displayed are totally, uniquely yours — forever.

The 'Application Notes' section below discusses various aspects of using these random passwords for locking down wireless WEP and WPA networks, for use as VPN shared secrets, as well as for other purposes.

The 'Techie Details' section at the end describes exactly how these super-strong maximum-entropy passwords are generated (to satisfy the uber-geek inside you).



Application Notes:

A note about 'random' and 'pseudo-random' terminology:
Throughout this page I use the shorthand term 'random' instead of the longer but more precise term 'pseudo-random'. I use the output of this page — myself — for any purpose, without hesitation, any time I need a chunk of randomness because there is no better place to find anything more trusted, random and safe. The 'pseudo-randomness' of these numbers does not make them any less good.

There are ways to generate absolutely random numbers, but computer algorithms cannot be used for that, since, by definition, no deterministic mathematical algorithm can generate a random result. Electrical and mechanical noise found in chaotic physical systems can be tapped and used as a source of true randomness, but this is much more than is needed for our purposes here. High quality algorithms are sufficient.

The deterministic binary noise generated by my server, which is then converted into various displayable formats, is derived from the highest quality mathematical pseudo-random algorithms known. In other words, these password strings are as random as anything non-random can be.

This page's password 'raw material':
The raw password material is provided in several formats to support its use in many different applications. Each of the password strings on the page is generated independently of every other, based upon its own unique pseudo-random binary data. So there is no underlying similarity in the data among the various format passwords.

64 hex characters = 256 binary bits:

D40D26AAF21511CB16F59ED22EAE8ECC5E40445A73EA46BC7422C58471CFD7EC
Each of the 64 hexadecimal characters encodes 4 bits of binary data, so the entire 64 characters is equivalent to 256 binary bits — which is the actual binary key length used by the WiFi WPA pre-shared key (PSK). Some WPA-PSK user interfaces (such as the one in Windows XP) allows the 256-bit WPA pre-shared key to be directly provided as 64 hexadecimal characters. This is a precise means for supplying the WPA keying material, but it is ONLY useful if ALL of the devices in a WPA-protected WiFi network allow the 256-bit keying material to be specified as raw hex. If any device did not support this mode of specification (and most do not) it would not be able to join the network.

Using fewer hex characters for WEP encryption:
If some of your WiFi network cannot support the newer and much stronger (effectively unbreakable when used with maximum-entropy keys like these) WPA encryption system, you'll be forced either to run two WiFi networks in parallel (which is totally feasible — one super-secure and one at lower security) or to downgrade your entire network to weaker WEP encryption. Still, ANY encryption is better than no encryption.

WEP key strength (key length) is sometimes confusing because, although there are only two widely accepted standard lengths, 40-bit and 104-bit, those lengths are sometimes confused by adding the 24-bit IV (initialization vector) counter to the length, resulting in 64-bit and 128-bit total key lengths.

However, the user only ever specifies a key of either 40 or 104 binary bits. Since WEP keys should always be specified in their hexadecimal form to guarantee device interaction, and since each hex digit represents 4 binary bits of the key, 40 and 104 bit keys are represented by 10 and 26 hex digits respectively. So you may simply snip off whatever length of random hex characters you require for your system's WEP key.

Note that if all of your equipment supports the use of the new longer 256/232 bit WEP keys, you would use 232/4 or 58 hexadecimal characters for your pre-shared key.


63 printable ASCII characters hashed down to 256 binary bits:

zS_CL?c-n&ldmx?{pFYK;l]`4NJKelyYXZXPS'-<'W`iXis9[shz+MQN]#Z:xr
The more 'standard' means for specifying the 256-bits of WPA keying material is for the user to specify a string of up to 63 printable ASCII characters. This string is then 'hashed' along with the network's SSID designation to form a cryptographically strong 256-bit result which is then used by all devices within the WPA-secured WiFi network. (The ASCII character set was updated to remove SPACE characters since a number of WPA devices were not handling spaces as they should.)


The 63 alphanumeric-only character subset:

MEElfYzIMjO327t0dLDLUOBwGgBDvvg310sbyaJbtRpPVSExzir3vUHHMc0DTpp
If some device was not following the WiFi Alliance WPA specification by not hashing the entire printable ASCII character set correctly, it would end up with a different 256-bit hash result than devices that correctly obeyed the specification. It would then be unable to connect to any network that uses the full range of printable ASCII characters.

Since we have heard unconfirmed anecdotal reports of such non-compliant WPA devices (and since you might have one), this page also offers 'junior' WPA password strings using only the 'easy' ASCII characters which even any non-fully-specification-compliant device would have to be able to properly handle. If you find that using the full random ASCII character set within your WPA-PSK protected WiFi network causes one of your devices to be unable to connect to your WPA protected access point, you can downgrade your WPA network to 'easy ASCII' by using one of these easy keys.

And don't worry for a moment about using an easy ASCII key. If you still use a full-length 63 character key, your entire network will still be EXTREMELY secure. And PLEASE drop us a line to let us know that you have such a device and what it is!


Shorter pieces are random too:
A beneficial property of these maximum entropy pseudo-random passwords is their lack of 'inter-symbol memory.' This means that in a string of symbols, any of the possible password symbols is equally likely to occur next. This is important if your application requires you to use shorter password strings. Any 'sub-string' of symbols will be just as random and high quality as any other.


When does size matter?
The use of these maximum-entropy passwords minimizes (essentially zeroes) the likelihood of successful 'dictionary attacks' since these passwords won't appear in any dictionary. So you should always try to use passwords like these.

When these passwords are used to generate pre-shared keys for protecting WPA WiFi and VPN networks, the only known attack is the use of 'brute force' — trying every possible password combination. Brute force attackers hope that the network's designer (you) were lazy and used a shorter password for 'convenience'. So they start by trying all one-character passwords, then two-character, then three and so on, working their way up toward longer random passwords.

Since the passwords used to generate pre-shared keys are configured into the network only once, and do not need to be entered by their users every time, the best practice is to use the longest possible password and never worry about your password security again.

Note that while this 'the longer the better' rule of thumb is always true, long passwords won't protect legacy WEP-protected networks due to well known and readily exploited weaknesses in the WEP keying system and its misuse of WEP's RC4 encryption. With WEP protection, even a highly random maximum-entropy key can be cracked in a few hours. (Listen to Security Now! episode #11 for the full story on cracking WEP security.)


The Techie Details:
Since its introduction, this Perfect Passwords page has generated a great deal of interest. A number of people have wished to duplicate this page on their own sites, and others have wanted to know exactly how these super-strong and guaranteed-to-be-unique never repeating passwords are generated. The following diagram and discussion provides full disclosure of the pseudo-random number generating algorithm I employed to create the passwords on this page:



While the diagram above might at first seem a bit confusing, it is a common and well understood configuration of standard cryptographic elements. A succinct written description of the algorithm would read: 'Rijndael (AES) block encryption of never-repeating counter values in CBC mode.'
CBC stands for 'Cipher Block Chaining' and, as I describe in detail in the second half of Security Now! Episode #107, CBC provides necessary security in situations where some repetition or predictability of the 'plaintext' message is present. Since the 'plaintext' in this instance is a large 128-bit steadily-increasing (monotonic) counter value (which gives us our guaranteed never-to-repeat property, but is also extremely predictable) we need to scramble it so that the value being encrypted cannot be predicted. This is what 'CBC' does: As the diagram above shows, the output from the previous encryption operation is 'fed back' and XOR-mixed with the incrementing counter value. This prevents the possibility of determining the secret key by analysing successive counter encryption results.
One last detail: Since there is no 'output from the previous encryption' to be used during the encryption of the first block, the switch shown in the diagram above is used to supply a 128-bit 'Initialization Vector' (which is just 128-bits of secret random data) for the XOR-mixing of the first counter value. Thus, the first encryption is performed on a mixture of the 128-bit counter and the 'Initialization Vector' value, and subsequent encryptions are performed on the mixture of the incrementing counter and the previous encrypted result.
The result of the combination of the 256-bit Rijndael/AES secret key, the unknowable (therefore secret) present value of the 128-bit monotonically incrementing counter, and the 128-bit secret Initialization Vector (IV) is 512-bits of secret data providing extremely high security for the generation of this page's 'perfect passwords'. No one is going to figure out what passwords you have just received.
How much security do 512 binary bits provide? Well, 2^512 (2 raised to the power of 512) is the total number of possible combinations of those 512 binary bits — every single bit of which actively participates in determining this page's successive password sequence. 2^512 is approximately equal to: 1.34078079 x 10^154, which is this rather amazing number:
13, 407, 807, 929, 942, 597, 099, 574, 024, 998, 205,
846, 127, 479, 365, 820, 592, 393, 377, 723, 561, 443,
721, 764, 030, 073, 546, 976, 801, 874, 298, 166, 903,
427, 690, 031, 858, 186, 486, 050, 853, 753, 882, 811,
946, 569, 946, 433, 649, 060, 084, 096
As far as the crypto experts know, the only workable 'attack' on the Rijndael (AES) cipher lying at the heart of this system is 'brute force' — which means trying each one of those many combinations of 512 bits. In other words, the passwords being generated by GRC's server and presented for your exclusive use on this page, are safe.

Ipsec Pre Shared Key Generator

Gibson Research Corporation is owned and operated by Steve Gibson. The contents
of this page are Copyright (c) 2016 Gibson Research Corporation. SpinRite, ShieldsUP,
NanoProbe, and any other indicated trademarks are registered trademarks of Gibson
Research Corporation, Laguna Hills, CA, USA. GRC's web and customer privacy policy.

Wpa Pre Shared Key Linksys


Free Pre Shared Key Generator Online

How to Add a New Pre-Shared Key

If you are using pre-shared keys, you must have one pre-shared key for every policy entry in the ipsecinit.conf file. If you add new policy entries while IPsec and IKE are running, the in.iked daemon can read in new keys. This procedure assumes the following:

Pre Shared Key Blackberry

  • The in.iked daemon is running

  • The interface that you want to protect with IPsec is an entry in the /etc/hosts file on both systems, for example:


  • You have added a new policy entry to the /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf file on both systems. For example, the entry on enigma looks something like the following:


    For example, the entry on ada looks something like the following:


  • You have created a rule for the interface on ada in the /etc/inet/ike/config file on both systems. For example, the rule on enigma looks something like the following:


    For example, the rule on ada looks something like the following:


    Note –

    All arguments to auth_method must be on the same line.

Pre Shared Key Example

  1. On the system console, become superuser or assume an equivalent role.

    Note –

    Logging in remotely exposes security-critical traffic to eavesdropping. Even if you somehow protect the remote login, the total security of the system is reduced to the security of the remote login session.

  2. Check that the in.iked daemon permits you to change keying material.


    You can change keying material if the command returns a privilege level of 0x1 or 0x2. Level 0x0 does not permit keying material operations. By default, the in.iked daemon runs at the 0x0 level of privilege.

    (It's likely they won't even be able to enter all possible bytes if they tried.) Second, because user's aren't going to enter random bytes, but words. First, because the set of printable of characters is much smaller than that of all bytes. Using your program generate round keys for windows.

  3. If the in.iked daemon does not permit you to change keying material, kill the daemon. After killing the daemon, restart the daemon with the correct privilege level.

    For example,


  4. Generate random keys and combine the output to create a key of 64 to 448 bits.

    On a Solaris system, you can use the od command.


    For an explanation of the command, see How to Generate Random Numbers and the od(1) man page.

  5. By some means, send the key to the administrator of the communicating system.

    You are both going to add the same pre-shared key at the same time.

  6. Add the new keying material with the add preshared subcommand in the ikeadm command mode.


    id-type

    The type of the id.

    id

    IP address when id-type is IP.

    mode

    The IKE mode. main is the only accepted value.

    key

    The pre-shared key in hexadecimal format.

    For example, on host enigma, you add the key for the new interface, ada, 192.168.15.7


    On host ada, the administrator would add the identical key, as in:


    Note –

    A message of the form Error: invalid preshared key definition indicates that you gave incorrect arguments to the add preshared command. You might have mistyped a parameter. You might have omitted a parameter. Retype the command correctly to add the key.

  7. Exit the ikeadm command mode.


  8. On each system, lower the privilege level of the in.iked daemon.


  9. On each system, activate the ipsecinit.conf file to secure the added interface.


    Note –

    Read the warning when you execute the command. A socket that is already latched, that is, the socket is in use, provides an unsecured back door into the system.

  10. On each system, read in the new rules by using the ikeadm command.

    A sample of the new rules for ada and enigma are at the start of the procedure. Because the rules are in the /etc/inet/ike/config file, the name of the file does not have to be specified.


  11. To ensure that IKE pre-shared keys are available at reboot, edit the /etc/inet/secret/ike.preshared file.

    Enter the arguments to the add preshared command into the file on each system, as shown in the following substeps.

    1. For example, on the enigma system, you would add the following keying information to the ike.preshared file:


    2. On the ada system, you would add the following keying information to the ike.preshared file: